Ep662: Edward McQuarrie – Never Ever Sell Naked Calls

Andrew Stotz 00:02
Hello fellow risk takers and welcome to my worst investment ever stories of loss to keep you winning. In our community we know that to win an investing you must take risk but to win big, you've got to reduce it. Ladies and gentlemen, I'm on a mission to help 1 million people reduce risk in their lives. So join me go to my worst investment ever.com and sign up for the free weekly become a better investor newsletter where I share how to reduce risk and create grow and protect your wealth. Fellow risk takers this is your words podcast hosts Andrew Stotz, from a Stotz Academy, and I'm here with featured guests. Edward McQuarrie. Edward, are you ready to join the mission?

Edward McQuarrie 00:43
Oh, yes.

Andrew Stotz 00:46
I'm Ben excited to have you on and I want to just introduce you briefly to the audience. Edward McQuarrie is a professor emeritus at Santa Clara University. He writes on market history and personal finance. And his research has been mentioned in columns in the Wall Street Journal MarketWatch. And Barron's, his papers can be downloaded from ssrn.com. And he posts at him as mcq@bogleheads.org, where you can view some of the charts mentioned today, Edward, take a minute and tell us about the unique value that you bring into this wonderful world.

Edward McQuarrie 01:20
All righty. Well, for our podcast today, Andrew, the unique value is I'm going to tell a story such as you normally elicit. But then at the second half, with your prompting, I'll be talking about why 2022 was the worst investment mistake ever, if you owned any kind of bonds. Okay, so back to you, Andrew.

Andrew Stotz 01:42
Yeah, so maybe we'll get started by just getting into your worst investment ever. And like I always say is that we never go into our worst investment thinking it will be. So maybe you can take us through the circumstances and what happened?

Edward McQuarrie 01:59
All right. So first question, have you done what sin calls trading options trading here on the podcast so far will listeners be familiar?

Andrew Stotz 02:09
I mean, listeners will be familiar, but we haven't gone through any major one. So just keep it as simple as possible. Professor.

Edward McQuarrie 02:17
Alrighty, well, always difficult for me. But so, you know, basically, years ago, in order to keep my hands off the big money in my 401 K account, I gave myself a small Play account. And in that play account, which I opened with broker, I began to trade options, and more particularly, I began to sell naked puts. Now again, briefly sound sexy. If you sell a naked put, you are obligating yourself for a small premium. Don't buy the stock at that price, no matter how far it falls in between the time you bought. Now, the good thing about naked puts is your loss can be total, but it is limited. Stocks can't below go below zero. Okay, and that's the most you can use. And one of the takeaways from today's podcast will be, you may want to trade naked puts as I did, but you should never ever trade naked calls. Imagine selling a call on Tesla, just before it went up. Because there is no limit to how far a stock can go up. GameStop, AMC, et cetera. All right. So here's the story. I hope some of your listeners go back to the great financial crisis of 2007 2009. I've been trading puts and calls for four or five years at that point. And it is November 2008. Lehman Brothers has already gone bust the markets going down, and it's going down. So that's a good time to sell a naked put, or so I thought because, I mean, how much further is it gonna go down? All right. So it's November, I'm on vacation with the family back east somewhere. I live in California. And, you know, unfortunately, the hotel has a web connection, my Wi Fi connection. When I left California, I think I had $21,000 in the account and my maintenance requirement was only 11,000. So, you know, I could withstand some losses and not have a margin call, which is when your broker says, give me more money, or I shoot your investments. Okay. And, you know, so, you know, we'll go ahead and

Andrew Stotz 05:00
If I was just saying poof, exactly, that's

Edward McQuarrie 05:03
what happens. So anyway, here it is, I log on in the morning don't have see the in laws till later in the day and holy crap. Now I have an account with an $11,000 balance, cut in half, and a $21,000 maintenance requirement, which means I'm $10,000 short. And well, that was my worst investment ever. What I did was I said, Okay, take a deep breath, you can fix this, okay, start to close your positions, take the loss. And the way some of these maintenance requirements work, you're better off to just take the loss and then the maintenance requirement is not so high. So after 30 minutes of frenzy to position covering, I think I only had a margin call of about $2,000. So I fired up the Home Equity Line, transfer the equity line into my checking account, transfer the checking account into my brokerage account, and survive to trade another day. Okay, so, Andrew, that is my worst investment ever.

Andrew Stotz 06:20
And how would you summarize? I mean, you've already told us about, you know, avoiding for instance, you said, Never sell naked calls. What other lessons did you learn from that?

Edward McQuarrie 06:34
Well, first of all, keep your play money small. Many listeners will know Burton Malkiel, one of the index fund inventors board member at Vanguard for many years. Linda you interviewed in Barron's a couple of weeks ago, and indicated that he liked to pick individual stocks, because he does it with this tiny, tiny amount of his total portfolio. And he said, Hey, look, anybody who follows the markets, all their life has a gambling instinct. So control it, keep your play money small. So that's implication number one. Because, you know, if I had been wiped out if the whole 21,000 had been gone, I was like, Well, that was 21,000 out of a, you know, a million plus, okay, I can I can withstand that. So lesson number two, you know, always have a lifeline. Okay? If I didn't have a home equity line with spare capacity, that I could just tap for a few $1,000. And you know, then, you know, they might have sold out the entire account and said, You owe us 500 bucks instead of leaving me with the 510 1000 whatever I had left. So, lesson number two, if you're going to gamble, we I Andrew, I don't know if you ever played kitchen table poker when you were young. When I was young, that was called nickel, dime, quarter poker. Okay? It's inflated sense, of course. But you know, I started in college bunch of buddies, I never went to Las Vegas, it was just nickel, dime, quarter poker. But even there, the key thing was only bring $30 in your pocket. Bring anymore, okay. And so that's what I mean, by having the equity line the lifeline a little spare money in case you totally screw it up.

Andrew Stotz 08:25
It's great. Maybe I'll just share a couple of quick things. I mean, I think it's a great lesson. And I was thinking about, you know, I have my five nieces who I helped them start investing when they were 18. And I gave him each $3,000. And I set up a Vanguard account, and help them set that up in their name. And then they got them started in like the Vanguard VT fund. And I felt like just on every stock in the world and just follow your uncle and put money in every single month. And don't worry about it. And they don't know anything about the market. And they're not that interested. And I said and the cool thing is when you go out to parties, unlike Burton Burton, where he was saying that, you know, he has this, you know, his little pics that he's made, you can go out to a party and someone talks about a stock and you can just say, I own that. Also, that's a good line. And then you're like, I own that. And then someone else talking Yeah, but I'm, I'm investing in this turnaround in Taiwan. And it's really cool. Oh, I own that one too. And because you own every stock in the world, I think the VT funds up to 9300 stocks. You own every single stock. And so, you know, enjoy the fact that you own all of these. And the other thing that I like to say too about that is that, you know, you have 9327 CEOs and 9327 management teams working their butts off to overcome inflation and everything else. So I think that those types of investments are you know, fantastic. And also, you know, I think the other lesson and this all apply in Thailand when I moved to Thailand in 92. And now At Five, we started a coffee roasting factory, while I was head of Research at a sell side broker, and my best friend was running that business, but we had one thing really clear, we were to Ohio boys, who knew we were never going to get money from anybody, particularly a Thai bank, as a startup and non tie, and we don't have any assets, we have nothing. We knew from the beginning that we had to sell Finance, any catastrophe we faced. And therefore, it set a mentality that I always had to have backup to, to survive. And now we're 30 years in now. And we've just survived 80%, fall in revenue for two years, and maintain our management team and most of our employees in our business. And we did get, you know, some help from, you know, good suppliers and good customers, and also a little bit from the banks. But mainly, we knew that ultimately, we have to take care of ourselves. And I think that's the thing that you mentioned about have a lifeline, which I, you know, really, really love that preparation. So anything you would add to that before we go on to bonds.

Edward McQuarrie 11:07
Do I think you've got it exactly right. You know, so many small businesses fail, and you're to be complimented simply because you know, you didn't play like one of the internet companies go big or get destroyed. Yeah, stayed small and were never destroyed.

Andrew Stotz 11:27
As my business partner says, he says, you know, there's just some rounds, where you just your whole objective is not to get knocked out. And he said that what he said, It's, he said, and right now I'm in round 347.

Edward McQuarrie 11:48
And if your listeners know anything about gamblers ruin, most gamblers never make it around. 347.

Andrew Stotz 11:54
Exactly. All right. Talk to us about bonds and 2022.

Edward McQuarrie 12:00
Okay, so, the short answer, Andrew, is that 2022 was the worst year ever to be a bond investor, okay. Now, you know, whenever someone tells you quote, worst ever, unless they're talking about personal investment mistakes, okay? Anytime some historian says or you read in The Wall Street Journal that your ex or stock, why was the worst ever? All your yellow light should come on? Okay, you can say we really worst ever. Why don't you tell me the hedges. So I know what we're dealing with here. And when I say worst ever, there are two hedges. I'm only talking the safest government bonds. So in other words, you know, if you want to say worst ever, and you don't put that hedge and the worst ever is always either why Mar Germany and the hyperinflation and bonds went to trillions of a penny on the dollar, or it's 1917 in Russia and they took you Bond shot you and that was that. Okay? So you need that hitch. 2022 was the worst bond market ever, for the individual who thought they were not going to make a mistake, because they put their money in the safest government bond out there. Okay. And so again, there's, there's charts@boglehead.org, I'm just going to give you the summary here, no webinar, no PowerPoints. Basically, when you say bonds, you mean one of three things. You might mean the total bond fund, which is the US equivalent of that total world stock fund that you just described. It owns everything, okay? Treasuries, corporates, everything that's investment grade, one year, maturity on out to 3040, whatever. 2022 was the worst year ever, in the 50 year history of that instrument, and it wasn't even close. Okay. So the second thing you might mean when you say savings bonds, as you might say, total bonds, you've got all those long bonds in there, I don't know. So you go, I know, intermediate treasuries, too much duration risk, you know, they're going to pay you back in 567 years, full faith and credit of the United States. None of those downgraded corporate bonds. 2022 was the worst year ever for the intermediate Treasury owner. And the statistics there, go back to 1926. Okay. The other thing you might mean when you say the safest government bond, is you might mean a 30 year United States Treasury. Okay. 30 years guaranteed pay payments from the full faith and credit of the world hedge Amman, okay 2022 was the worst year for long government bonds since 1792. Okay, but wait, I've got even more data than that. Okay. Some of it directly over in Thailand there are some of your listeners will be familiar with the British console. dates back to 1753. It was a perpetuity. Okay, so no maturation day, here's the coupon or pay it to you, for as long as the United Kingdom Government is here on this planet. So this is the ultimate long term safe government bump. And the parallel here Vanguard has a fun called the extended duration Treasury fund. It's got almost as much duration as a perpetuity like the console's. If you owned that extended duration treasury bond fund in 2022. You had the worst year, in 250 years, that safe government bonds have been out there. It really was that bad. Now, I'm going to stop there and pause a little bit. Andrew, see if you have some questions for me. If we have time, I'll explain to the listeners why buying a safe government bond in January 2022. Was any bond investors worst investment choice ever?

Andrew Stotz 16:32
So let's just first of all, make sure that we've got this clear. So you're talking about all types of bonds, the first one you talked about as a total bond fund, which has both treasuries and corporate bonds, but you said no, wait, what if we just do intermediate treasuries, we get rid of the corporates. And we look at just pure government bonds at an intermediate duration. So we were talking about what five to 10 years, something like that. And then you talked about the 30. Year, well, let's just say we just buy a 30 year US Treasury, so it is long duration, but it's government, government, US government, so therefore, there's no credit risk related to businesses or anything like that. And then finally, you talked about perpetuity. In fact, in Thailand, we have now had perpetuity issuances, by a couple of companies, where basically there is no maturity and therefore no final date, let's say that the principles repaid and therefore this would be the longest duration type of bond. And then for the listeners out there, the general concept is that when you think that bond prices are going to fall, you want to be in a short duration bond, if you think that bond prices are going to rise, you want to be in a long duration bond because of the volatility of that instrument. So long duration bond, you don't want to be in when bond prices are falling, because tech tend they tend to fall more if I'm correct about that. That's my summary. Anything else you would add to that?

Edward McQuarrie 18:13
No, it's a great summary in and I'll segue into my explanation in just one minute here. And so you're absolutely right. The reason people, you know, kind of put a lot of weight on intermediate treasuries, in most, you know, kind of sane above board, high integrity, financial planning, is because duration is low. And so even if you have a bad year, theoretically, you're gonna lose 2% or 3%. Okay, because the duration is short. But 2022 was so big, that the intermediate Treasury owner will last 1011 12%. Okay, at the worst point, why did that happen?

Andrew Stotz 18:57
Why can Oh, can I can I just ask. So one of the ones you didn't mention was a short term US Treasury, where we know a short term has less volatility to a downward move or an upward move. Is there a reason why you didn't mention that?

Edward McQuarrie 19:17
Ah, okay, let's go to the ultimate short duration instrument, the treasury bill 30 days or 90 days sold at a discount. The way the discounting mathematics works. After a day or two or three of holding it, you cannot lose money. Okay? Because you know, you bought it at 98. And it's going to mature at 100. And every day goes 98 and an eighth, 98 and a quarter. And even if interest rates soar that month, well, you stayed at 98 and a quarter for a couple of days, and then it started inching up again, because it's due in 90 days. Okay. Now, treasury bill owners did not lose money in, in truth 1022 They got the three basis point yield, they were promised, okay, they made $3 for every 10,000, they put in t bills, no loss. Okay. So that's the other reason why people end up in intermediate treasuries is that it's the sweet spot for getting some kind of yield, without too much risk with T bills, no risk, and sometimes no yield.

Andrew Stotz 20:26
And, and just to highlight, you've just illustrated an important point, the problem, let's say, with a 30 year treasuries, that nobody holds them to maturity, they're going to eventually sell them. And the benefit of the treasury bill is that you're forced, basically, that portfolio is holding them to maturity kind of naturally, because there's no sense in trading them when you've got them for such a short maturity. And that brings us to another point, which is, when we talk about bond losses, we're talking about mark to market losses or losses if you sold but let's just say you had a 10 year, let's just say that you bought a 10 year government bond from the US government, and you never looked at the quote in the market as what was going on. You lent the government, you know, X amount, and they promised to pay this amount and return that money at the end of the period. Just for the listeners who don't understand completely about bonds, you would have gotten the promised return. But you just if you had paid attention to the ticker of what's going on, or the price of that bond, you would realize Holy crap, I put in 100. And now it's worth you know, you know, 80, or whatever that is, am I correct? In that? Professor?

Edward McQuarrie 21:42
Absolutely. Andrew, you got it. You hide your expertise? Well, my friend. And so to to play that back to the listeners. Nobody who holds a US Treasury to maturity ever loses any money in nominal terms? No. Okay. It's when you trade them before maturity, that 2022 serves as a lesson of just how much you can lose, and how short a period of time in an instrument that would have been completely safe. If you'd held it for the entire 30 years. Okay. So in some ways, a lot of investors of course, don't buy even treasuries directly. They buy a Vanguard Treasury mutual fund, which is continually refreshed with new bonds and old bonds exit out or mature. And so these losses aren't particularly likely to be found by the mutual fund investor. Because, you know, they're, they're not holding to maturity. So, the question I want to get to, though, before we run out of time, is why was 2022 so bad? Okay, because let's face it, the consoles went through the Napoleonic Wars, US Treasuries went through government bonds went through the panic of 1837, the Civil War, the panic of 1873 1929, yada, yada, yada, yada. Why was 2022 so bad? Well, the dirty little secret that beginning bond investors are not told is that there's actually two inputs to duration. Everybody knows that the shorter the maturity, the shorter the duration, the lower the volatility, the less fluctuation in prices, but they don't tell you in bond 101, you got to make a double bond to a one for this insight is that the lower the coupon, the higher the duration. Okay? And what was the coupon payment on a long Treasury at the beginning of 2022? It was like one and a half percent, not 3%, not 4%, not 6%. And so basically, there was only one other time in US history, that long treasuries got that low. It was just after World War Two, the government controlling the prices, but the bond bear market that followed 1946 Took about 20 years even to get up to a walking speed. And, you know, eventually it starts sprinting and yields galloped up in the 60s and 70s. But the thing that made 2022 so poisonous, was the fact that coupons had gotten so low, when you've got a one and a half percent coupon and anything goes self you know, a mere one percentage point rise in rates. Duration is high. The bond price takes it on the chin And if it goes up to are two and a half points, which is what happened in 2022, you can see $100 Bond worth a government bond worth 7882, something like that in one year. And of course, the coupon doesn't defray that loss of your one and a half percent better off than price appreciation alone. So the short answer if anyone listening today has to sit in a bar stool and say, Well, why was 2022 so bad for bond investors, because it started with coupons pressed down to the floor.

Andrew Stotz 25:37
So let's try to understand this a little bit. So when we talk about maturity, it's easy to understand like a big payment being paid 2030 years away. But when we talk about coupon, it's a little bit harder to visualize the duration issue, because coupon basically means they're going to be paying you that flat amount over the period of time. Now, let me ask you, was it a duration issue? Or was it a kind of percentage increase, so that you start at a very low level of interest rate, and interest payment, and then from a percentage increase? It's just like, wow, it's just crazy amount of increase.

Edward McQuarrie 26:24
You know that that's an interesting tick, I think, you know, mathematically, they're probably just two sides of the coin. But the way you put it may be more assessable, to our listener base. So for instance, basically, long governments went from a coupon of 1.5 to a coupon of four. So that's up two and a half. And that impact is expressible, in terms of duration. But another way to look at it is, let's see, 250 divided by 150, that's 166% increase in coupon over the space of less than one year. Whereas I've told several journalists, I don't know if bonds will have a positive return in 2023 or not. But I know that they started at 4%. And even if they coupon goes up another two and a half percent this year, to something that nobody expects six and a half percent, well, that's 2.5 divided by four, and that's only 62% rise, not 160. So you can certainly look at it that way. If you're a bond investor, and you see a coupon on a long bond, as way down there on the floor, you got to be prepared for this to be the worst bond investment you ever made.

Andrew Stotz 27:47
Yeah, wow. And there's a couple other points that I wanted to make about this, because it's something that happened in the 2008 mortgage crisis, because what, typically, mortgage loans for homes don't have a lot of risk of default. And even if they do default, the underlying collateral of the house prevents that loan from being you know, from typically falling from, let's just say the value that the company that the bank has is 100, that's not going to go down to 10. It's not going to fall by 90% in value, because you have an underlying asset there. So if we looked at the bout of portfolio of mortgage loans, just as a whole, we would see that, you know, it's not like a corporate loan, where there's a potential that that business could go bust. So maybe you could say that the fall in value during the 2008 crisis of these types of loans, could have been 20%, maybe 30%. But there's ultimately an underlying collateral there. However, what happened was, we had instruments that had an accumulation of many of these, and then the instrument was quoted in the market. And this type of mortgage backed security was quoted in the market. And when the market basically collapsed, the price of that fund that owned all of those could fall by 90%. And all of a sudden, banks were forced to mark to market a 90% loss on a portfolio that would probably only have a 20% loss over the long term. And so that's where instruments are interesting, as opposed to, you know, if a bank owned that, that was loans themselves, and I'm just thinking about when you're investing in a bond fund, you're naturally going to be investing in something that is priced. There's the price of the font, and they're going to have to, you know, mark to market whereas as an individual, you don't have to do that if you were to own a particular book. on. So that's a round round away thing, but I'm just curious what your thoughts are on that?

Edward McQuarrie 30:05
Oh, you know, it's interesting to look back to the 2007 Nine crisis, and that's when that put trade went south for me. But, you know, I think there were two things and we're gonna, we're going to wander off into the swamp of complexity pretty quickly. So when you raise your finger, I'm going to stop. Okay. There are two things going on, that I'll add to the story you told. The first was this notion that the mortgage is backed by collateral, of course, assumes honesty, and diligent underwriting. So, you know, does that house actually exist at that address? Or is it simply an empty lot? Okay, you know, some of the loans then, not sure if this phrase made it into the accounts you see over in Thailand, but they were called liar's loans. Okay, because there was no documentation. And, you know, basically, economists say, if a good is free, it will be wasted. If you don't have to document your mortgage application, you will cheat. Okay. And so, the first problem was, people thought they were buying mortgages in the 1970s 1980s. Since we're banks, you know, you want to borrow money from us. Let me see your three piece suit. Let me see 10 years of income tax forms, maybe we'll give you a loan to the loose days of the early 2000s. Post, Michael Milken were liar loans proliferated, because the bank made a fee for passing on the trash to someone else. The people that got the trash bundled it up. And then the second element was those instruments that you refer to, it would be one thing if they were simply, you know, 1000 mortgages spread across the country, same as a bond fund has 1000 different corporate bonds spread across the economy. But in fact, of course, what they did was they took, you know, the 1000 mortgages, and through financial alchemy, they split it into six funds. Okay. And, you know, the safe trash as they call them, would continue to pay its interest, as long as the mortgage did not fall by 50% or more. Okay. And the banks that own those instruments did okay. But way up at the top, you know, we're the hedge fund, you know, kind of appetizers where, if the mortgage skipped a single payment, you know, the value of that tranche would fall by 50%. Okay, it's those tranches, that turned into toxic waste, and really, almost brought down the financial system.

Andrew Stotz 32:55
And this type of thing generally doesn't happen in Thailand, in Asia, and in most other countries in the world. And the reason why is, we don't have a secondary market for, for mortgages, for home mortgages. And we definitely don't have a secondary market and market in home mortgages. That's supported by government policy. And, unfortunately, in America, I would say Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have a giant sucking sound, as someone said many years ago, and they're sucking as many mortgages as they can get under a government mandate to hold mortgages at that time, of lower and lower quality. So there was a government policy that was able to be backdoored, through these quasi government entities, without the taxpayer, seeing the obvious loss that was coming. And eventually, that loss was felt at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and, of course, around the world. And so as long as the originating banks know that they have a guaranteed buyer, as long as they go within the limits of what they were requiring, and those limits were getting looser and looser, then they knew that, you know, they can get rid of these things. Whereas in Thailand, as an example, every mortgage loan that a bank in Thailand has given us but it's going to be on their books until it's repaid,

Edward McQuarrie 34:26
which concentrates the mind of the banker making the loan. And of course, the other thing too, is that my understanding is the United States is the only place where you can buy a 30 year fixed mortgage, the rest of the world says, Who wants to take a risk for 30 years, five year adjustable

Andrew Stotz 34:43
that can only be done by having a secondary market. And I would argue that the solution in America and it should have been done after 2008 is Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac should have been privatized. Nothing wrong with having a secondary market but you need to be done and market prices and Annie Mae and Freddie Mac could go out and raise long term money 30 year money at a reasonable market rate and then use that money to buy long term fixed, you know, 30 year mortgages but of course, that'll never happen. So watch out for backdoor and when governments backdoor their spending ideas. That's my lesson from that. We

Edward McQuarrie 35:22
none dare call it moral hazard.

Andrew Stotz 35:26
Yes, well, we have such good morals. So why would we do that anyways? Yeah, I, I really want to thank you for sharing your story, and also your experience and knowledge in this area. And I'm gonna wrap up the show by asking you a personal question. It could be personal, it could be professional, but what is your number one goal for the next 12 months?

Edward McQuarrie 35:54
Well, listen, you should understand that I retired six years ago. And actually, my retirement didn't work out I was a complete failure at it. Okay. Given up the paycheck, I was able to do that. Giving up the faculty meetings, that was easy. Okay, giving up the grading was easier yet. But the part that I found unable to give up was the writing. Okay. And so my number one goal for the following year, Andrew is the same as it was last year, which is to write as much good stuff as I can pump out the door.

Andrew Stotz 36:32
Exciting, and the world is better for it, listeners. There you have it another story of loss and a great discussion to keep you winning. Remember, I'm on a mission to help 1 million people reduce risk in their lives. If you've not yet joined that mission, just go to my worst investment ever.com and join my weekly free, become a better investor newsletter to reduce risk in your life. As we conclude, Edward, I want to thank you again for joining our mission. And on behalf of a Stotz Academy, I hereby award you alumni status for turning your worst investment ever into your best teaching moment. Do you have any parting words for the audience professor

Edward McQuarrie 37:08
on the total stock market, just like Andrew said,

Andrew Stotz 37:13
boom. And that's an let me ask you can I add one last question? Should we also own the total bond market and mix that or based upon your experience? Should we just own the total stock market?

Edward McQuarrie 37:29
It of course you know the answer here depends on how much risk you want to assume. And I have a whole thread at Bogle heads right now it's called just look for the one by McHugh diversification Allah Markovitz. You'll find it. And the answer to your question is that I find intermediate treasuries to be superior to total bond. If you're the stock investor, who got a little older hands are starting to shake a little bit. Fear is starting to mount up to match greed. No, okay. Because you know, there's always that balance. Yep. And only if you are willing to give up on maximum wealth gain, as far as it goes, only then should you own any kind of bond. But when you get to that point, intermediate treasures.

Andrew Stotz 38:19
Fantastic. And that's a wrap on another great story to help us create, grow and protect our wealth fellow risk takers, let's celebrate that today. We added one more person to our mission to help 1 million people reduce risk in their lives. This is your worst podcast host Andrew Stotz saying I'll see you on the upside.